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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the dissent in the Longstreth case is Opinion of the Justices."
This is an advisory opinion given by the Alabama Supreme
Court at the request of the legislature on the question of whether
a proposed statute legalizing the bookmaking and pari-mutuel
system of betting on horse races and dog races would be con-
stitutional. In a four-to-three decision, the court advised the
legislature that such a statute would violate the constitution's
anti-lottery clause. The reasoning employed by the majority
was that, although skill and judgment might go into the de-
termination of the winner, the fact that the amount to be won
is unknown makes it a lottery. The dissent in the advisory
opinion, while giving a detailed resume of the Alabama and
United States decisions generally, maintained that since skill
and judgment did go into the determination of the winner,
that is sufficient to take it out of the anti-lottery clause.
In conclusion, it is submitted that however sound may seem
the argument of the dissent in the Longstreth case it is for
the legislatures and not the courts to judge the relative merits
and evils of such gambling legislation. A careful study of the
decided cases indicates that the principal case is in accord with
the weight of authority in the United States today. 12
BURTON A. LIBRACH
PERSONAL PROPERTY-FINDER V. LIFE TENANT, LIFE TEN-
ANT V. REMAINDERMAN-Plaintiffs, while swimming in a
newly dug canal of the Chariton River in Missouri, discovered
an ancient Indian canoe. One end was imbedded nine feet
in the bank, the other rose six inches above the water. One
Nina Haney held a life estate in the river bank, and Ella Evans
held the remainder in fee. Biegel, one of the defendants, aided
the plaintiffs in removing the canoe from the bank; when he
refused to give up the find, the plaintiffs began this action of
replevin. Prior to the bringing of the action, the plaintiffs
had purchased all of the rights which the life tenant of the
real estate had in the canoe. The remainderman intervened.
11. 248 Ala. 516, 31 So.2d 753 (1947).
12. People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N.E. 439 (1932); Commonwealth
v. Ky. Jockey Club, 238 Ky. 739, 38 S.W.2d 987 (1931); Roban v. Detroit
Racing Ass'n, 314 Mich. 326, 22 N.W.2d 433 (1946); Utah State Fair
Ass'n v. Green, 68 Utah 251, 249 Pac. 1016 (1926).
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From a judgment in her favor, plaintiffs appealed.' The
Kansas City Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court, and stated that the canoe was property embedded in
the soil, and, therefore, had become part of the realty. The
court denied plaintiffs' contention that it was personal property
belonging to the life tenant, and said that real property wrong-
fully severed from the land becomes personalty, but descends
to the next vested estate of freehold. Two cases, Williamson v.
Jones et al.1 and Miller v. Bower Coal and Mining Co.,' were cited
and relied upon by the court in the instant case. In both these
cases the life tenant removed coal or oil from the earth. It was
held that wealth derived from the tortious acts of the life
tenant may not be retained by him but descends to the remaind-
erman.
Plaintiffs' contention that they were entitled to the property
as finders was denied,4 the court citing several cases bearing on
the rights of finders.5 Elwes v. Briggs Gas Co.' was most
heavily relied upon. In the Elwes case the lessee-finder dug
up a 2000 year old canoe while building upon the leased land.
The lessee was not permitted to retain the canoe either as
lessee or as finder because the lessor, through his acts of owner-
ship over the land, had posession of the boat when the lease
was made.
1. Allred et al. v. Biegel et. al., 219 S.W.2d 665 (Mo.App. 1949).
2. 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S.E. 411 (1897).
3. 40 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1931).
4. Plaintiffs waived their rights as finders but the court discusses
them at length. See Appellant's Brief, p. 7, Alfred et al., v. Biegel et al.,
219 S.W.2d. 665, 666 (Mo. App. 1949).
5. Ferguson v. Ray, 44 Ore. 557, 77 Pac. 600 (1904); Sovern v. Yoran,
16 Ore. 269, 20 Pac. 100 (1888); Kuykendall v. Fisher, 61 W.Va. 87, 56
S.E. 48 (1906); Goddard v. Winchell, 86 Iowa 71, 52 N.W. 1124 (1892);
Burdick v. Cheesebrough, 94 App. Div. 552, 88 N.Y. Supp. 13 (1904);
Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 162 Mo. App. 165, 145 S.W. 139 (1912).
Preceding these citations the court talked of "lost property," and after-
wards that it was not interested in that theory. We may infer that
"that theory" means the application of the "unattached article" concept of
"lost," "mislaid" and "abandoned" property (READINGS ON PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY, 342 [Fryer's 3d ed. 1938]) to goods buried beneath the soil. This
doctrine is discussed in these cases. It represents the one exception to the
principles of Elwes v. Briggs, 33 Ch. D. 562 (1886). When that doctrine
is used, the finder takes the goods, the landowner not being the custodian
for the true owner. (See Note 14, infra).
6. 33 Ch. D. 562 (1886). To support the force of the prior possession of
the landowner in the Elwes case the court cites Reg. v. Rowe, 32 L.T. 339
(1859). In that case, Rowe took iron from the bottom of a recently drained
canal. The owners of the canal, although totally ignorant of the presence
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The court seems to have felt that the Missouri case involved
two separate branches of the law: First, the interest of the life
tenant as opposed to that of the remainderman; and Second,
the interest of the finder as opposed to that of the land owner,
whether life tenant or remainderman.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss extensively
the real property aspects of the case, i.e., the first division the
court makes. Summarily, it would seem that the court is on
solid legal ground in awarding the canoe to the intervener-
remainderman. 7  Removing the canoe from the ground would
probably be sufficiently prejudicial to the remainderman's in-
terests so as to nullify the rights of the life tenant.
The law in regard to finders, i.e., the second division the
court makes, is more complex." This is due to the fact that
possession is a prerequisite to finding.9 The facts in the instant
case may be described as "the finder v. the land owners." The
area thus restricted may be divided into two factual situations.
One occurs when the locus in quo is open to the general
public. 10 Amusement parks and stores are places which fall
into this category." Here, since the force of the owner's
authority over the land is diminished by public entry, courts
of the iron, were held to have sufficient possession to support a criminal
suit by the state.
7. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, §§ 59, 427, 435, 436 (2d Abr. ed. 1940).
8. Statutes in many states require the finder to follow a specified pro-
cedure in order to secure the true owner's interest. This purpose could
not be served in this case. Generally, the finder is required to turn the
goods over to a magistrate court for a certain period, during which time
advertisement is made for the true owner. See: Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 15317,
15318, 15319, 15320, 15321, 15322 (1939).
9. Shartel, Meanings of Possession, 16 MINN. L. REV. 611 (1931). Aig-
ler, Rights of Finders, 21 MIcH. L. REv. 664 (1922) developed the follow-
ing classifications:(1) Finder v. the owner of the chattel found; (2) Finder v. stranger;(3) Finder v. the owner or occupant of the premises; (4) Finder v.
the landlord; (5) Finder v. the master; (6) Finder v. another finder;
and (7) Finder v. the state.
It will be seen that the present case comes under number (3) while the
Elwes case falls under number (4).
10. Hoagland v. Forest Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335,
70 S.W. 878 (1902). Here the court considered a purse under a table as
"lost property." The finder was arrested when he refused to give up the
purse. He recovered damages in an action for false arrest.
11. Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 18 L.T. (o. s.) 154 (1851). Bills were
found on the floor of a shop. The court gave the goods to the finder, say.
ing that the shopkeeper never had possession of them. See discussion on
this and the Elwes case in Goodhart, Three Cases on Possession, 3 CAMB.
L. J. 195 (1928) ; and criticism thereof in Francis, Three Cases on Posses.
sion-Some Further Observations, 14 ST. Louis L. REv. 11 (1928).
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are more willing to favor the finder in cases where the goods
are not described as "mislaid."
The present case falls into the second factual situation, i.e.,
where the general public has only restricted entry. This
situation itself is capable of another dual separation on the
basis of whether the property is unattached or attached to the
land. Where the property is unattached, the owner of the land
is given "custody" of the goods for the true owner.12  Where
the article is embedded in the soil, the doctrine of Elwes V.
Briggs (that the landowner takes by prior possession) has
received general acceptance in this country.13 In this situation
we are not technically correct in the heading of finder v. the
landowner. No finder can possibly exist. The landowner, through
his control over the surface, has control of that which lies
beneath. Since possession (at least constructive possession, as
it is termed by some courts) is vested in the owner of the
land, it cannot be acquired by a finder. Actually, the finder is
a discoverer. If we say that a finder is the first person to take
possession of an article severed from its true owner, we may
conclude that the owner of the land is a finder. It follows that
the land owner has a right by prior possession that he may
assert against any one who gains subsequent possession of the
land except the true owner of the chattel.
When we apply these concepts to the present case, a conflict
12. Foster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Co., 264 Mo. 89, 174 S.W. 376(1915).
13. The idea of giving the land owner possession of things beneath the
soil is ancient in origin. In English common law its most honored exposi-
tion occurs in POLLOCK AND WRIGHT, ESSAYS oN PossEssIoN 26 (1888).
The gist of the theory is the land owner's control over the land, the key-
stone of his right is his prior possession derived from the general author-
ity over the property. When the property bears the characteristics of the
English doctrine of treasure trove, some courts have given the goods to
the finder. Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 71 Atl. 858 (1908); Danielson
v. Roberts. 44 Ore. 108, 74 Pac. 913 (1904); Vickery v. Hardin, 77 Ind.
App. 558, 133 N.E. 922 (1922). Although the concept has meant different
things at different times (note excellent summary, Emden, The Law of
Treasure Trove-Past and Present, 42 L. Q. REv. 368 [1926], the doctrine
in England crystallized into a limited sphere covering gold or silver plate.
It must be hidden in the earth. Courts in this country have not recog-
nized the ooctrine expressly. They have achieved the same results by re-
moving the prior possession of the landowner, and considering the goods
as lost property. The doctrine is not recognized in Missouri. Cases fol-
lowing the Elwes case are: Burdick v. Cheesebrough, 94 App. Div. 552, 88
N.Y. Supp. 13 (1904); South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, [1896]
2 Q.B. 44; Goddard v. Winchell, 86 Iowa 71, 52 N.W. 1124 (1892); Liver-
more v. White, 74 Me. 452 (1883).
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appears between the law of real property and the law of
personal property. The law of finders requires the land owner
to take through his prior possession of the chattel. The inter-
vener-remainderman was never in possession of the Haney
farm; and, consequently, could never have had prior possession
of the canoe. Under the doctrine of Elwes v. Briggs, as it is
normally applied by the courts, the plaintiffs, as assignees of
the life tenant, should recover. However, if the principles
applicable to the life tenant-remainderman relationship are used,
an opposite result would be reached.
The practical results in the instant case are not unfair. The
important relationship of life tenant-remainderman may have
been preferred to the special rules of the law of finders. Also
the court may have wished to settle the conflict between finder
and landowner, whether life tenant or remainderman, in accord
with the concepts of personal property; and then, with these
claims quieted, proceed to settle the interests between life
tenant and remainderman on the basis of real property law.
However, it did not mark this approach with sufficient clarity 4
to avoid the confusion arising from the fact that the Elwes
case contained a basic element (prior possession) which was
not present in the instant case.
FRANK M. MAYFIELD, JR.
TORTS-APPLICABILITY OF CRIMINAL STATUTE IN CIVIL CASE-
WHAT CONSTITUTES BREACH OF STATUTE. In a recent Minnesota
case,' a mining company was held liable for injuries sustained
in an accident occurring on the highway below its railroad
bridge. Ore falling from the railroad cars had partially
obscured a sign warning of the bridge. The bridge, used
exclusively by the mining company for transportation of its
ore, was supported by a pier, in the middle of the highway.
Signs had been erected on the bridge itself to warn of the pier,
but in the use of the bridge, ore had fallen out of the cars
onto the bridge and the rain had caused a mud-like mixture
14. "We have found no case wherein the doctrine announced in Elwes
v. Briggs has been criticized. It rests upon sound principles, is logical,
and should 'be the law in this jurisdiction." Alfred v. Biegel, 219 S.W.2d
665, 666 (Mo. App. 1949).
1. Robinson et al. v. Duluth, M. & L R. Ry., 38 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1949).
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